State v. Keithly Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 39033 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-31-2012
State v. Keithly Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39033
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Keithly Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39033" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1117.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1117
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STA.TE OF IDAHO. ) 
) 









REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District, in and for Valley County 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin, 
District Judge 
MATTHEW C. WILLIAMS 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
KENNETH R. ARMENT 
Valley County Deputy Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade. ID 83611 
(208) 382-7120 
;\ ttorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross 
Respondent 
APPELLANT'S REPY BRIEF, 
PAUL J. FITZER 
Moore Smith. Buxton & Turcke, Chartered 
950 W. Bannock Street. Suite 520 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ................................... . 
ARGUtv1ENT ...................................................................................... . 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................. . 
APPELLANT'S REPY BRIEF, 




TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Clark v. rVonnacott, 30 Idaho 98, 162 P. 1074 ( 1917) 
City of:ikCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656 (2009) 
STATUTES 
Idaho Code § 6-602 .................................................. . 
Idaho Code § 6-608 ................................................................ . 
Idaho Code §31-4304 ............................................... . 
Idaho Code§ 67-2340 .............................................................. .. 
Idaho Code§ 67-2347 ............................................................... . 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, 






1. Habitual, Patterned, and Repeated Constitutional and Statutory Violations 
Regarding Lack of Notice and Lack of Holding Elections; Secret Meetings and 
Decisions; and Making Up Office Terms and Alternatives for Not Holding 
Elections Are Not De Minimus Procedural Errors. 
The Respondents disappointedly, but not surprisingly, in their presentation before the Court have 
chosen to ignore the record, facts and reasons for the Usurpation, Declaratory Judgment, and Injunctive 
Relief actions brought against them. They have universally refused to accept any accountability for 
their actions and their harm to the public. They have refused to acknowledge their lack of diligence and 
failure of their duty and opportunity to rectify the lack of elections and their repeated use of secret 1 
meetings, secret decisions and secret actions in avoidance of public accountability2. Respondents 
simply refuse to address what authority they may take on their own, without judicial scrutiny and 
approval, to "cure" the lack of holding required elections and providing the required notices of election. 
The "cure" for missing the mandatory 2010 November election for the board position for Yvette Davis 
was to continue a pattern of demonstrated democratic dysfunction, neglect and public exclusivity 
A. Respondent Yvette Davis did not hold office with authority of law after 
her illegal reappointment by the SVCRD Board. 
Even if the Court accepts Respondent Davis's theory that she was lawfully in office prior to 
January, 2011 3, and the Couit accepts that the other directors were holding office legally and with the 
authority of law, there is no legal support for the SVCRD Board's illegal appointment of Yvette Davis 
to fill the expired term. 
Respondent Davis now argues she held office until the successor was elected, but the minutes of 
the meeting in January 201 1, show a much different approach than what she is arguing now. The 
minutes clearly show the SVCRD Board appointed Davis to fill the term left vacant by expiration of 
the term. The position was declared vacant4. The record is void of any claim by Davis prior to her ille-
I Idaho Code § 6 7-2340 defines meetings and provides that the formulation of public policy is public 
business and shall not be conducted in "secret." 
2 Idaho Code § 67-234 7 Violations, (1) actions at meetings failing to comply with the Open Meeting 
Law "shall be null and void": See, Citv ofA1cCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656 (2009). 
3 The election for the term was missed; no publication of authority or administrative or judicial 
determination approving a replacement election was made; and the advertise position was for 
"President" of the SVC RD Board for a term not provided by statute. 
4 April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 3, p.22, ln. 1 S & 16, January 11, 2011 SVCRD Board 
Minutes "Motion by Mike Smith, seconded by Pat Cowles to accept letter of intent from Yvette Davis 
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gal appointment that she was the valid hold over office holder. Further, legal counsel for the SVCRD 
clearly planned and participated in for her re-appointment as represented to the office of the Attorney 
General5 The Board, \Vithout advertising there would be a vacancy, and in a common theme seen 
throughout the SVCRD's existence up to that point in time of making decisions without proper notice 
or following the law, decided to appoint Davis to the new term by secret decision. The SVCRD ap-
pointed Davis in direct contradiction to Idaho law to fill the position pending a special election. Idaho 
Code§. 31-4305 (prohibits board members from appointing a vacancy for expired term); & Id .. Nei-
ther the SVCRD Board at the time, nor Davis, nor any of the Respondents now, nor the District Court 
in its decision, cite any authority for the holding of a special election to fill the seat vacated by expira-
tion. The record is silent as to any official decision by the S VCRD Board to hold the special election. 
This also is de minimus? Better to make it up and argue it is a de minimus procedural error than to pro-
vide notice; comply with law; or seek judicial approval for public accountability. This is the Respond-
ents' way. 
Respondent Davis then argues that the V CPA should not have taken action to oust Davis from her 
seat when the only justification in the public record for her illegal appointment was the vacancy created 
by the dereliction of duty by the SVCRD Board, to which she was the longest serving member. Since 
the Board acted directly contrary to Idaho law, Davis now points to Clark v. Wonnacott. 30 Idaho 98, 
162 P. I 074 (1917) for the justification of her existence on the Board following the expiration of her 
term. 
B. Clark is greatly distinguishable from the situation Respondent Davis 
and fellow SVCRD Board members created· 
In Clark, the newly elected county assessor died after the election but prior to taking office. As 
a result, Wonnacott continued to hold office as the elected assessor. The county commissioners de-
clared the seat vacant and appointed a successor to Wonnacott. Wonnacott refused to turn over the of-
until May election. No further discussion. Passed unanimously.'' There were no records of any previous 
January meetings or meetings in which issue of vacancy, declaring the position vacant, or announcing a 
vacant position were made. 
5 April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 2, p, 2, Paul Fitzer April I, 2011 email to Brian Kane "We 
declared the chair vacant on Jan 1 and the Board appointed an interim replacement until the May 
election" and April 1, 2011 Affidavit of Mattew C. Williams, Exhibit B, December 7, 20 I 0 letter from 
Stephanie Bonnie to Williams, p. 2, In. 14 & 15, "We both that the Board should declare the 
Subdistrict 3 seat vacant at its first meeting in January and appoint a board member to serve until the 
election in May." 
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fice and litigation ensued. Id .. This Court ruled that until such time as a replacement was elected and 
qualified Wonnacott was entitled to the office. 
This case presents circumstances much different than those in Clark. Factually and on public 
policy grounds promoting democracy, Clark can and should be distinguished from this case. Davis, 
though in office for more than 10 years, had never been elected. Wonnacott, the incumbent in Clark 
had been duly and lawfully elected. It was through multiple errors of the SVCRD Board, some of 
which came during her tenure as the chairman of the Board, that led to her holding office for so many 
years without election. Specifically, it was the errors in the 2006 election cycle, as well as the 2010 
election cycle, both of which fall squarely on the SVC RD Board, which created the problem. In Clark, 
there is no evidence whatsoever that Wonnacott played any role in creating the vacancy. Wonnacotf s 
hands were clean. In this case it is undisputed the lack of action on behalf of the Board, even when 
prompted by the public that they had to have an election, led to the expiration of the term without a 
person being elected or qualifying. To further exacerbate this situation, Davis had done this very same 
thing four years earlier in the 2006 election cycle. 
Furthermore, the elected Clerk's position is dramatically different from that of a Board member 
of the SVCRD. As the sole elected person to the constitutional office of county clerk, leaving the of-
fice vacant upon the expiration of the term would not be wise and would cripple that area of the gov-
ernment. As such, the public policy reasons for Wonnacott's lawful holdover are great. The functions 
and duties of the elected clerk are set out in the Idaho Constitution and statutes and must be carried out. 
The duties cannot be performed without someone in the Clerk's position with the authority oflaw. In 
this case, presuming the other Board members were lawfully holding their seats, the SVCRD Board 
could have continued to fully function as a Board because the remaining two members were able to ful-
fill the quorum requirements. 
Respondent Davis lacks the clean hands that Wonnacott had in the Clark case and is, at a mini-
mum, partially responsible for the failure to hold a mandated election. Davis was never elected to the 
office. Since Davis \Vas responsible for the failure to have an election, Davis should not qualify to hold 
over into the office her dereliction caused. As the longest serving member of the SVC RD Board, and 
one who had missed a previous election deadline, Davis should have been aware of when her term 
would expire. Even when urged by the public she refused to take action on the expiration of her term. 
C. Public policy does not support an non-elected officer's right to hold of-
fice beyond the specified term when the officer's actions or inactions 
created the vacancy. 
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The public policy argument made by the Respondents is based on the District Court's errone-
ous finding that the errors made are not attributable to the Board. Respondents' Brief pg. 15, 16, and 
footnote 58. Though the Respondents correctly cite the District Courts' opinion, they specifically 
choose to gloss over the "pattern of procedural errors in the notice of election by the SVC RD over ap-
proximately a five year period." Respondents' Brief: footnote 58, pg 15. Further, the Respondents ig-
nore the state of the law prior to the changes impacting elections which changed the responsibility for 
the elections on January 1, 2011. The record simply does not support the District Court's findings that 
the SVCRD Board, to which Davis was the longest serving member, was not responsible for the elec-
tion mistakes. 
The consistent pattern of failing to follow the simple laws regarding the publishing for and 
holding of elections are not small errors. The failure to follow the law disenfranchises voters of their 
constitutional right to vote and have representation of their choosing on a Board with taxing authority. 
No matter who the SVCRD Board delegates the responsibilities to, it is ultimately their job to prepare 
and publish election notices and cancellations, making sure the election schedule is followed for their 
district. What is before the Court is not a one-time error vvhich is de minimus. What is before the 
Court is a consistent pattern of ignoring and/or thwarting the requirements necessary to have a func-
tioning and duly elected Board accountable to the public. The Respondents' conduct individually and 
collectively as the SVCRD Board demonstrates a "pattern" of errors, compounding on each other, to 
which the SVCRD and Davis, the only member present through all of the errors and the specific bene-
ficiary of at least three of the errors, failed to address or remedy. Allowing the SVC RD Board to disen-
franchise voters to the benefit of the Board members only encourages the conduct which led to the va-
cancy. Public policy does not, and should not reward a Board member for failing to follow the law 
multiple times over the span of five years and multiple election cycles. The arguments set forth to sup-
port this type of dereliction in elected duties is "incredulous" and "almost beyond description." 
D. Davis was a member of the Board that declared her spot vacant and 
abided by that declaration, waiving any right to hold over. 
Another key difference between the situation presented in Clark and the situation with 
Respondent Davis, is that Davis was a member of the group that declared her seat vacant. In Clark, the 
Kootnai County Commissioners declared the seat vacant. The elected county commissioners are not 
part of the elected Clerk's office, nor are they constitutionally part of the office. Wonnacott objected to 
the declaration and refused to vacate the office. In this case Director Davis was a part of the SVC RD 
Board of Directors. As early as December 7, 2010, Davis was willing to go along with the decision to 
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declare the seat vacant. See letter from Stephanie Bonney dated December 7, 2010, n.5 supra. At no 
time did Davis object to this declaration of vacancy. Director Davis went along with the decision, 
probably with the secret understanding she would be appointed in the interim. Respondent Davis va-
cated the position and then accepted the appointment without advance notice to the public and was 
sworn in to serve as the newly appointed Director for the new term in the interim pending the election. 
Even if Davis had the right to hold over as a director, she certainly had the ability to waive that 
right. By going along with the Board's decision to declare the seat vacant, submitting her request to fill 
the vacancy, and then accepting and being sworn in as the Director for the new term, Davis waived any 
right she had to hold over. 
Davis's consent to the decision and the SVCRD Board's illegal appointment of her is recorded 
in the January 11, 2011 minutes. Davis's answer to the complaint admits the subdistrict 3 term held by 
Davis would terminate January 1, 2011. Davis Answer pg. 4. It is clear from the record before this 
Court Davis intended to relinquish her director position. The record is also clear from the emails be-
tween the SVCRD attorneys Stephanie Bonnie and Paul Fitzer and the Idaho Secretary of State's Of-
fice and the Idaho Attorney General's Office that this course of conduct was acceptable. Davis relied 
on bad advice when making her decision, but none-the-less followed that advice and voluntarily gave 
up her position. She cannot now claim a legal right on something she voluntarily gave up and re-write 
history. She made the history. 
E. The Usurpation Action Was Not Moot Upon Yvette Davis's Election Loss 
in May 2011. 
The Respondents urge this Court to uphold the District Court's opinion the case became moot 
upon the loss of election of Yvette Davis to the challenger in the replacement election never voted on 
by the SVCRD Board, but announced to the public by their attorney Stephanie Bonney. This argument 
ignores the clear guidance on this issue specifically setting out in the cases declaring the issue is 
viewed at the time the case is brought, and not sometime later. Historically, usurpation has been con-
sidered quasi criminal in nature. As a result, simply changing the circumstances does not change 
whether the person was usurping office at the time the action was brought. It is clear usurpation ac-
tions are decided on the circumstances at the time the action was brought. Simply vacating office to 
avoid the usurpation action runs contrary to the established law and public policy. If someone is usurp-
ing office and are still in office without the color of law at the time the action was brought, they cannot 
escape the possible consequences simply by relinquishing the office. 
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In the same manner, bad Yvette Davis won the election, it would not have voided the State's 
action against her, but it would have validated her term of service from the date of the canvassing of the 
election forward. Whether she was usurping office prior to the election would still remain an issue un-
resolved by the election. 
The impact of allowing someone to relinquish office to avoid litigation is contrary to public pol-
icy and contrary to the case law on the matter. By allowing the case to be mooted, this Court would be 
allowing someone to willfully usurp office and avoid accountability for that usurpation by resigning on 
the eve of trial. Thus, the usurper could usurp office through negotiations with the prosecuting attor-
ney's office, continue to usurp during the pendency of the case, and then resign on the eve of hearing 
making the case moot. Just as in this case, that course of conduct could result in months of usurpation 
only to have no recourse upon the resignation of the usurper. This interpretation would render the law 
meaningless, gutting the statute and diluting the lawful election process. 
In arguing the case is moot, the respondents ignore the potential penalties for usurping office 
other than removal from office. Though removal from office is primary penalty for holding office ille-
gally, there are other penalties as well. Idaho Code § 6-608. 
2. Attorney's Fees Should Not Be Granted To Respondents 
A. The VCPA's actions were made with a reasonable basis in fact or law and 
were required by Idaho Code. 
Assuming, arguendo, this Court does not reverse the District Court's decision dismissing the 
case and remand the case for further proceedings; attorney's fees should not be granted. As the re-
spondents point out, attorney's fees should be awarded if the non-prevailing party acted without rea-
sonable basis in fact or law. The District Court, after looking at all the evidence and facts presented 
ruled as follows: 
The Court cannot find that this action, initiated by the State, was done with-
out a reasonable basis in fact or law. This was a course of conduct that occurred dur-
ing the course of four election cycles. The State had a duty and obligation to investi-
gate this matter and to present to the Court what they believed to be substantial pro-
cedural irregularities. The Court has ruled that the actions were de minimus. that 
these officers held their office pursuant to the de facto officer doctrine, and that the 
State did not have standing to pursue these procedural claims. All of that being said, 
the Court cannot find that pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, that this was a ground-
less action or that the District has borne an unfair and unjustified financial burden 
defending against groundless charges. Memorandum Decision pg. 11. 
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The District Court not only rejected the Respondent's groundless claim, the District Court spe-
cifically ruled the "State !tad a duty and obligation to investigate this matter and present to the Court 
what they believed to be substantial procedural irregularities." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, 
there were so many irregularities in the various election cycles; as demonstrated in the record, the State 
had to bring the case. Further, the appointment of Yvette Davis in direct contradiction to the authority 
granted the directors under state law, coupled with the Respondents' collective stonewalling refusal to 
address the situation with the VCPA required that such a case be brought. 
As the record shows in this case, the VCPA's office did not want to get involved with the case. 
When individuals first brought what was going on at the SVCRD and the election irregularities, the in-
dividuals were turned away and told to go speak with the Secretary of State's Office. It was only after 
review of the appropriate statute did the VCPA agree to look in to the matter. After finding the multi-
ple violations of Idaho Law, including the illegal appointment of Davis, the VCPA followed the statute. 
The usurpation statute is very specific and requires the prosecutor bring the case. The VCP A would 
have been avoiding a statutory requirement had it ignored the evidence brought to it. 
B. The Respondents Lack Standing to Seek Attorney's Fees. 
Several of the Respondents in this case were sitting SVC RD Board members when the initial 
cases were filed. As a result, these individuals, being sued in their individual capacities, did not pay for 
their individual defenses but rather voted to pay for the defense of their suits with tax collected funds 
when the District Court denied the State's motion to prohibit the SVCRD from expending public funds 
for the legal defenses of the individual Respondents. Since the Respondents did not pay for their legal 
defenses and the SVCRD is not party to this litigation or the appeals, the Respondents lack standing to 
seek attorney's fees for their defense as the SVCRD paid those expenses and the Respondents are cor-
respondingly not entitled .to any recovery for the same. 
The Respondents make this point, calling it "[w]orthy ofICRP l l(a)(l) sanctions" for seeking a 
fine of up to $5,000 on Mr. Cowles for something in his "individual" capacity for errors the SVCRD 
Board made. It is ironic the Respondents completely ignored the "individual" capacity of the suits 
when voting to make the people of the SVCRD pay for defense of the "individual" suits. 
This issue became especially clear when the VCPA 's office negotiated a tentatively acceptable 
settlement with the newly elected SVCRD Board to end this litigation prior to any briefing on appeal. 
However, because the SVC RD Board was not the named party they could not dispose of the cases, 
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even though the SVC RD had paid for the entire litigation and were still paying at the time of the tenta-
tive resolution. 
CONCLUSION 
The State urges the Court to promote democracy and accountability of public officials in open 
government and find that meaningful notice, suffrage and elections are worthy of judicial protection in 
accordance with traditional and valued notions of substantial justice and the expectations of the Idaho 
and American citizens. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2012 
Matthew C. Williams 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I caused a trne and correct copy of the forgoing document to be served on the persons identified 
below on the date and in the manner set forth below. 
Paul J. Fitzer 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
DATED this 2r~ay of May, 2012. 
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